

Stakeholder finance: before and after the crisis



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partly based on: V. D'Apice & G. Ferri (2009), *L'instabilità finanziaria internazionale: dalla crisi messicana ai mutui subprime*, Carocci

Incontro di Econometica: “Le conseguenze della crisi finanziaria dal capitalismo dello shareholder value al capitalismo degli stakeholder”

Università Milano Bicocca, 2 February 2009



Outline

- ◆ At the origin of the present crisis:
 - “max shareholder value” vision and risk pricing
 - the crucial role of banks’ business model
- ◆ Banking as the crisis moves on:
 - markets value more relationship banking oriented banks
 - trust seeking and the success of “stakeholder value” banks
 - “stakeholder value” banks and credit crunch prevention
- ◆ Any lessons?



Origin: “max sh value” vision & risk pricing - 1

- ◆ Though “the theory of moral sentiments” came before “the wealth of nations” suggesting that the State and the individuals should cooperate for the invisible hand to work:
 - a Leviathan view prevailed in recent decades
⇒ minimize State and maximize shareholder value
 - this affects also the approach to risk pricing, e.g. the CAPM assumes orthogonal risk of defaults between state & privates

$$ER_i = r + \beta_i(ER^m - r)$$

where ER_i is the equilibrium expected return on asset i , r is the risk free return (approximated by government bond rates), ER^m is the equilibrium expected return on the diversified portfolio and $\beta_i = \text{cov}(R_i, R^m) / \text{var}(R^m)$




Origin: “max sh value” vision & risk pricing - 2

- ◆ The fallacy of this vision was highlighted by the fact that the State had to intervene to salvage imperiled financial intermediaries:
 - bank CDS were decreasing while state CDS were rising
- ⇒ the orthogonality assumption was just wrong
- ◆ Risk pricing models have to be revised
 - a possible objection: systemic crises are such rare events that we don't need to bother about them
 - counter-arguments: i) flooding may also be rare but the law forbids building dwellings in dry river beds; ii) systemic crises are becoming more frequent and severe



The crucial role of the bank business model

- ◆ From “*originate and hold*” to “*originate and distribute*”







As the crisis moves on: markets value more relationship banking oriented banks - 1

Stock markets re-priced financial intermediaries the most:

But the impact was much smaller for RB oriented coop banks:






As the crisis moves on: markets value more relationship banking oriented banks - 2

Contrary to the Too Big To Fail doctrine, stock markets re-priced more heavily the larger intermediaries:


This is consistent with less penalization for RB oriented banks

Figura 2: La reazione del mercato



fonte: Bankscope, Datastream

Correlation with individual banks' total assets





In the crisis: trust seeking & success of “stakeholder value” banks

- ◆ The crisis triggered a trust seeking deposit flight from shareholder value to stakeholder value banks:
 - banche di credito cooperativo and Banche popolari experienced a strong growth of deposits (even Sole 24 ore of 1/2/2009 noticed it)
 - cooperative banks are also expanding their lona market share, particularly vis-à-vis SMEs
 - similar trends elsewhere in Europe



In the crisis: “stakeholder value” banks & the credit crunch

- ◆ There are essentially three ways in which – compared to ordinary commercial banks – credit cooperatives may be helpful at a time of credit crunch:
 - they may be less inclined to ration credit to customers;
 - they may be less prone to raise the loan rate during a time of financial stress;
 - thanks to better capitalization and more prudent lending, credit cooperatives may be less likely to be distressed themselves and, therefore, may be better able to continue assisting their customers in a time of financial stress.
 - All of the three potential effects of the credit cooperatives stem from their governance, business model & specialization, which heavily relies on relationship-based retail banking



Lessons

- ◆ Three consequences of the crisis:
 - the idolatry of (purely) self regulating financial markets **is** over
⇒ *but how to re-regulate?*
 - the fixation with the single company model - i.e. shareholder value maximizing - **may be** over;
⇒ *but we need a lot of effort to clean up (e.g. the fake debate on the best practices of corporate governance)*
 - all of this **will have to be achieved** within a multi-polar world - as the US will be weaker - in which Asia and Europe will have, respectively, rising and declining weight