Do cooperators cooperate?

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
Social Motivation of coop workers

A laboratory experiment involving **84 workers** from a cooperative of production and work (*Formula Servizi*); 7 sessions with 12 subjects each.

From May 2009 to April 2010 at LES – Forlì.

Funding:

Motivation and aim

- Are coop workers different from other types of workers? Are they more "cooperative"?

- Right benchmark = workers in the same sector, belonging to non cooperative firms.

- Preliminary results: comparison with a group of **72 students** from the Forlì Campus.

Lab exp: students and non-students

- Experiments with students are effective and cheap/easy to set up.

- They allow for replication and international comparability.

- However, how much do the results extend to other social groups is questionable

- Coop organizations are supposed to be culturally different and might have a peculiar work climate.

Main sources for the classification methods

Brosig (2002), "Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game" *JEBO*.

Burlando-Guala (2005), "Heterogeneous agents in public good experiments", *Exp. Economics*

Fischbacher – Gachter – Fehr (2001), "Are people conditionally cooperative?" *Economic Letters*

Experimental design: 7 treatments

1) Dictator game

2) Public Good (PG) game: Strategy Method: 20 choices

3) Decomposed prisoner's dilemma: 24 allocations

4) PG game: 12 rounds

5) PG game: 12 rounds with communication

6) PG game: 12 rounds

7) Stag Hunt

Dictator Game: results

PG: Strategy method

Conditional cooperation – standard results

Classification from Strategy method

Conditional cooperators vs. **compensators**

Average contributions

Decomposed Prisoner Dilemma

| Question	Option A		Option B	
	Self	Other	Self	Other
1	+150	0	+145	+39
2	+144	-39	+130	-75
3	+130	-75	+106	-106
4	+106	-106	+75	-130
5	+75	-130	+39	-145
6	+39	-145	0	-150
7	0	-150	-39	-145
8	-39	-145	-75	-130
9	-75	-130	-106	-106
10	-106	-106	-130	-75
11	-130	-75	-145	-39
12	-145	-39	-150	0
13	-150	0	-145	+39
14	-145	+39	-130	+75
15	-130	+75	-106	+106
16	-106	+106	-75	+130
17	-75	+130	-39	+145
18	-39	+145	0	+150
19	0	+150	+39	+145
20	+39	+145	+75	+130
21	+75	+130	+106	+106
22	+106	+106	+130	+75
23	+130	+75	+145	+39
24	+145	+39	+150	0

The motivational vector

- The total sum (own plus other) allocated is not constant over the 24 combinations.

- There is no feedback concerning the other's choices. The final payoff is obtained by combining the 24 choices of each subject with those of the other player.

- Taking the 24 vectors chosen by each subject and adding them up, it is possible to obtain the motivational vector of each subject.

# The Value Orientation Circle

Coop workers vs. benchmark

Public good game: design

- Groups of 4 – Anonimous – Partners
- 3 sessions - 12 rounds for each session
- Linear PG Game: contributions are doubled and then equally shared among 4
- Belief elicitation before each round (prediction of average contribution, with paid incentive for accuracy).

# Public good game: standard results

**Herrmann-Thoni-Gachter (2008): 16 countries analysis**

# Public good game: benchmark

Public good game: comparison

Approval and Disapproval

emoticons

PG Game: remarks

While the benchmark behaves "as usual", some peculiar facts are observed among coop workers:

- They contribute much more on average (74% vs. 56%).

- They take advantage of a costless and simple communication technique to enhance group performance (no contribution decrease).

- Strategy Method: non-negligible percentage of compensators: example of *"we thinking"*

To do

- OUT: Comparison with a benchmark of non coop workers; other coop samples.
- IN: Analysis of the influence of:
- role at work (white / blue collar)
- age and seniority (time spent in the coop)
- gender, education, etc….