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Leonardo Becchetti, Giacomo Degli Antoni, Stefania Ottone, Nazaria Solferino

SUPPLEMENTARY ONLINE MATERIAL

Performance, luck and equality: An experimental analysis of subjects' preferences for different allocation criteria

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Performance, luck and equality: An experimental analysis of subjects' preferences for different allocation criteria. *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy*

Leonardo Becchetti
(University of Roma Tor Vergata)

University of Rome Tor Vergata, Department of Economics Law and Institutions, Via Columbia 2 00133 ROMA, Italy

Giacomo Degli Antoni
(University of Parma)
University of Parma, Department of Law, Politics and International Studies, via Università 12, 43121 Parma, Italy; Econometica, Inter-University Center for Economic Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility, via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126 Milano, Italy.

Stefania Ottone
(University of Milano – Bicocca)
University of Milano Bicocca, Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1, 20126 Milano, Italy; Econometica, Inter-University Center for Economic Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility, via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126 Milano, Italy.
Tel: +39 0264483223 Fax: +39 02 6448-3085 stefania.ottone@unimib.it

Nazaria Solferino
(University of Roma Tor Vergata)
University of Rome Tor Vergata, Department of Economics and Finance, Via Columbia 2, 00133 Roma, Italy

Section I :
Tables and Figures

Section I

FIGURE S1A.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

STAKE	INFOSTAKE	SPECTATOR	
		SUBJECT A	SUBJECT B
Instructions	*Instructions*		*Instructions*
Control Questions	*Control Questions*		*Belief elicitation*
Choice of the criterion	*Test and Secretarial Task*		*Test and Secretarial Task*
*Belief elicitation**	*Results*	*Instructions*	*Questionnaire*
Test and Secretarial Task	*Choice of the criterion*	*Control Questions*	
Results	*Risk Aversion (Holt&Laury)*	*Choice of the criterion*	
Choice of the criterion II	*Questionnaire*	*Results*	*Results*
Risk Aversion (Holt&Laury)		*Choice of the criterion II*	
Questionnaire		*Risk Aversion (Holt&Laury)*	*Risk Aversion (Holt&Laury)*
		Questionnaire	

*** in 3 sessions only**

FIGURE S1B
EXPERIMENTAL OBSERVATIONS

	Observations	Subjects for session	Ignorance of payoff distribution under different criteria	Information about payoff distribution under different criteria	Belief elicitation
STAKE	*87*	*15 subjects in 4 sessions, 14 in a session 13 in a session*	*YES*	*YES*	*YES for 42 subjects*
INFOSTAKE	*59*	*15 subjects in 3 sessions, 14 in a session*	*NO*	*YES*	*NO*
SPECTATOR SUBJECT A	*60*	*15 subjects in 4 sessions*	*YES*	*YES*	*NO*
SPECTATOR SUBJECT B	*59*	*15 subjects in 3 sessions, 14 in a session*	-	-	*YES*

TABLE S1.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Year of birth	Year of birth	265	1987.287	2.604	1970	1991
Male	Dummy variable (DV) taking value one if the respondent is a male	265	0.604	0.490	0	1
Income	Income level of the respondent's household	253	2.549	1.059	1	5
MathGrade	The average score of the respondent's school leaving examination	252	78.349	12.142	43	100
Expost	a dummy variable equal to 1 if the choice is made after having received information on payoff distribution					
Infostake	a dummy variable equal to 1 if the choice is made by an ex ante-informed stakeholder					
Stakeholder	dummy variable equal to 1 if the allocator is a stakeholder					
StakeholderInformed	dummy taking value one of the allocator is a stakeholder and is informed about payoffs.					
Deltapay_Luck	difference between player's payoff with the *Luck* criterion and the average payoffs of all criteria					
Deltapay_Equal	difference between player's payoff with the *Equal* criterion and the average payoffs of all criteria					
Deltapay_Copying	difference between player's payoff with the *Copying* criterion and the average payoffs of all criteria					
Deltapay_Logic	difference between player's payoff with the *Logic* criterion and the average payoffs of all criteria					
Deltapay_Protection+luck	difference between player's payoff with the *Protection+luck* criterion and the average payoffs of all criteria					
Deltapay_Protection+copying	difference between player's payoff with the *Protection+copying* criterion and the average payoffs of all criteria					
Deltapay_Protection+logic	difference between player's payoff with the *Protection+logic* criterion and the average payoffs of all criteria					

TABLE S2.
BALANCING PROPERTIES

Variables	STAKE (1) (Means)	INFOSTAKE (2) (Means)	SPECTATOR (3) (Means)	Mann-Whitney test H0: (1) = (2) (P-value)	Kolmogorov-Smirnov test or Chi2 test* H0: (1) = (2) (P-value)	Mann-Whitney test H0: (1) = (3) (P-value)	Kolmogorov-Smirnov test or Chi2 test* H0: (1) = (3) (P-value)	Mann-Whitney test H0: (2) = (3) (P-value)	Kolmogorov-Smirnov test or Chi2 test* H0: (2) = (3) (P-value)
Year of birth	1987.023	1987.288	1987.467	(0.814)	(0.786)	(0.319)	(0.947)	(0.208)	(0.447)
Male	0 .598	0.627	0.617	-	(0.721)	-	(0.817)	-	(0.906)
Income	2.553	2.526	2.482	(0.945)	(0.959)	(0.758)	(0.999)	(0.686)	(0.999)
MathGrade	77.222	77.714	80.178	(0.849)	(0.937)	(0.702)	(0.910)	(0.548)	(0.387)

* For continuous variables we test - through nonparametric statistics - between-subject differences by using the Mann-Whitney test. We also test differences in the distribution through Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, while for dichotomous variables we use the Chi square test to analyse the differences in proportions

TABLE S3.
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS IN THE "STAKE EX POST" AND "INFOSTAKE" TREATMENTS ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SELECTED CRITERIA

Treatment	Payoff distributions across different criteria	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Number of subjects who would maximize own payoff with this criterion*
STAKE ex post (N = 87)	pay_1 – *Luck*	8.54	.4	37.1	34
	pay_2 – *Equal*	0	14	14	13
	pay_3 – *Copying*	3.69	4.8	24.8	20
	pay_4 – *Logic*	4.07	5.3	21.6	21
	pay_5 – *Protection+luck*	5.97	4.5	30.2	0
	pay_6 – *Protection+copying*	2.58	7.6	21.6	2
	pay_7 – *Protection+logic*	2.85	7.9	19.3	1
INFOSTAKE (N = 59)	pay_1 – *Luck*	7.93	.7	33.5	27
	pay_2 – *Equal*	0	14	14	6
	pay_3 – *Copying*	3.34	6.1	22.2	10
	pay_4 – *Logic*	3.61	6.4	20.4	16
	pay_5 – *Protection+luck*	5.54	4.7	27.6	0
	pay_6 – *Protection+copying*	2.34	8.5	19.8	1
	pay_7 – *Protection+logic*	2.54	8.7	18.5	0

*In case for a subject two or more criteria gave the same maximum payoff, we took into consideration and included in the table all those criteria.

FIGURE S2A. CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY RELATED TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS OF DIFFERENT CRITERIA IN THE STAKE EX POST SCENARIO



FIGURE S2B. CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY RELATED TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS OF DIFFERENT CRITERIA IN THE INFOSTAKE TREATMENT



TABLE S4
SUBJECTS CHOOSING A NON-MAXIMIZING CRITERION

Treatment	Criterion	Number of times the criterion was selected without maximizing the payoff
STAKE ex post (number of obs. 87)	*Luck*	1
	Equal	6
	Copying	3
	Logic	4
	Protection+luck	1
	Protection+copying	3
	Protection+logic	3
INFOSTAKE (number of obs. 59)	*Luck*	1
	Equal	4
	Copying	2
	Logic	2
	Protection+luck	1
	Protection+copying	1
	Protection+logic	2

Section II

Statistical and econometric analysis – detailed results

Econometric specification

Our base probit specification (estimated for each j-th criterion) is

$$CHOICE_{ij}=\alpha_{0j}+\beta_k CONDITION_{kij}+\sum_l \gamma_l CONTROLS_{lij}+\varepsilon_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

where $CHOICE_{ij}$ is equal to 1 if subject *i* chooses criterion *j,* and 0 otherwise; $CONDITION_{kij}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the control treatment k (that is, the alternative treatment with which each benchmark treatment is compared); $CONTROLS_{lij}$ are socio-demographic controls and include a gender dummy, age, the number of household members and a dummy for students having no brothers or sisters, the average score on university exams, the score on the school leaving exam, two dummies equaling one if the mother (the father) has at least a high school degree, a dummy for those attending religious services, a dummy for students who are also part time workers, a dummy for those who volunteer and two discrete qualitative variables measuring the size of the town in which they live and income (see Tables S1 and S2 in Section I of the SOM for a description of the control variables and descriptive statistics).[1]

As a final check, we run the same probit regressions on the overall sample. Thus, we have a general idea of the overall effect of the ignorance on payoff distribution and of (net of) the effect of the given player's position (stakeholder or spectator) beyond what occurs in each two-by-two treatment combination.

Our base probit specification is now:

[1] We also use alternatively the number of previous experiments to which the subject participated and the Holt and Laury criterion to classify risk averse, risk lover and risk neutral players. Neither variable is not significant. Results are omitted for reasons of space and are available upon request.

$$CHOICE_{ij}=\alpha_{0j} + \alpha_1 STAKEHOLDER_{ij} + \alpha_2 EXPOST_{ij} + \alpha_3 INFOSTAKE_{ij} + \sum_l \gamma_l CONTROLS_{lij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

where $STAKEHOLDER_{ij}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the allocator is a stakeholder (her payoff is affected by her/his decision); $EXPOST_{ij}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the choice is made after having received information on payoff distribution; and $INFOSTAKE_{ij}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the choice is made by an ex ante-informed stakeholder. All other variables are defined as in (1).

Statistical analysis

i) *STAKE EX ANTE vs. STAKE EX POST* (column 1, Table 3 and column 1, Table S5). This comparison documents the within effect of receiving information on payoff distributions for stakeholders. Knowing the payoff distribution reduces significantly the choice of *Protection + logic* (from approximately 30 to 4 percent—Table 2), *Protection + copying* (from approximately 16 to 5 percent—Table 2) and increases significantly the *Copying* criterion (from approximately 8 to 20 percent—Table 2) and *Luck* (from approximately 6 to 32 percent—Table 2) among selected choices. In terms of combined choices, after receiving information about their payoff, stakeholders significantly reduce their preference for *Protection*, *At least logic* and *Desert*. In the econometric estimates, *Luck*, *Protection + copying* and *Protection + logic* confirm their significance. In terms of magnitude, the effect of receiving information on personal payoff is substantially similar to that found in descriptive Table 2 in the *Protection + logic* case (20 percent). However, the effect remains significant but substantially lower in the other two cases.

ii) *SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. STAKE EX ANTE* (column 2, Table 3 and column 2, Table S5): there are no strongly significant differences between stakeholders and spectators when they do not know the payoff distribution under the different criteria. The only slight

difference concerns *Protection + logic* because a higher number of spectators choose this criterion. These findings imply that ignorance of payoffs eliminates differences between spectators and stakeholders.

iii) *SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. STAKE EX POST* (column 3, Table 3 and column 3, Table S5): before receiving information on payoff distribution, spectators choose significantly more *Protection + logic* (approximately 43 percent if we examine the econometric estimates in Table S5) and significantly less *Luck* (16 percent—Table S5) and *Copying* (19 percent—Table S5) than do stakeholders after having received information. Choice aggregation documents that spectators under ignorance of payoff distribution choose significantly more *Protection* (55 percent—Table S5), *At least logic* (38 percent—Table S5) and *Desert* (21 percent—Table S5). These findings might be viewed as the combined effect of ignorance about payoff distribution plus stakeholdership.

iv) *SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. INFOSTAKE* (column 4, Table 3 and column 4, Table S5): spectators under ignorance of payoff choose significantly more *Protection + logic* (45 vs. less than 4 percent—Table 2) and significantly less *Luck* (15 vs. approximately 42 percent—Table 2) and *Copying* (approximately 3 vs. 17 percent—Table 2) than do ex ante-informed stakeholders. These results are confirmed by econometric estimates with magnitudes that are quite close to those shown in the descriptive tables. Choice aggregation documents that spectators before receiving information on payoff distribution choose significantly more *Protection* (55 percent more as documented in Table S5), *At least logic* (48 percent—Table S5) and Desert (45 percent—Table S5). These findings might be viewed as the combined effect of stakeholdership and ignorance on payoff distribution.

v) *SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX ANTE* (column 5, Table 3 and column 5, Table S5): after having received information on payoffs, both non-parametric tests and econometric estimates confirm that spectators choose significantly less *Logic* (10 vs. approximately 24

percent, Table 2—12 percent of the effect measured in Table S5) and significantly more *Luck* (approximately 18 vs. approximately 6 percent, Table 2—7 percent in Table S5) than do stakeholders in ignorance of their payoff under different criteria. This comparison provides the net effect of the countervailing forces of ignorance and stakeholdership vs. spectatorship and, in a sense, shows that ignorance dominates the stakeholdership effect in promoting the *Logic* criterion.

vi) *SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX POST* (column 6, Table 3; column 6, Table S5): evidence provided in Tables 3 and S5 confirms that differences between spectators and stakeholders who receive information about payoffs are strong. The former choose significantly more *Protection + logic* (24 percent—Table S5) and *Protection + copying* (2 percent—Table S5) but significantly less pure *Logic* (17 percent—Table S5) and pure *Copying* (15 percent—Table S5). Moreover, because of these combined differences, the former choose significantly more *Protection* (49 percent—Table S5) than do the latter. This comparison documents the effect of stakeholdership on the "removal of ignorance".

vii) *SPECTATOR EX POST vs. INFOSTAKE* (column 7, Table 3; column 7, Table S5): by considering non-parametric tests, we find that spectators, after having received information about payoff distribution, opt significantly more for *Protection + logic* (33 vs. approximately 4 percent—Table 2) and *Protection + copying* (13 vs. approximately 2 percent—Table 2) and significantly less for *Luck* (18 vs. approximately 42 percent—Table 2) and *Copying* (5 vs. approximately 17 percent—Table 2) than do ex ante-informed stakeholders. Choice aggregation documents that informed stakeholders choose significantly less *Protection* and *At least logic*. Econometric estimates in Table S5 confirm that spectators who receive information on payoff distribution choose significantly less *Luck* (33 percent) and significantly more *Protection + logic* (23 percent) than do ex ante-informed stakeholders, translating into a significantly stronger preference for criteria including protection (48 percent

more) and *Desert* (23 percent). However, significant differences on *Copying* and *Protection + copying* found in Table 3 are not robust to the introduction of socio-demographic controls. These findings might be viewed as the combined effect of stakeholdership with information and "removal of ignorance" for spectators.

viii) *SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX ANTE*: spectators after the removal of ignorance of payoff distribution choose significantly less *Logic* (10 percent vs. approximately 24 percent—Table 2) and significantly more *Luck* (approximately 18 percent vs. approximately 6 percent—Table 2) than do stakeholders under ignorance of payoff distribution. This comparison provides the net effect of the countervailing forces of the ignorance of payoff distribution and stakeholdership (vs. spectatorship) and, in a sense, shows that the ignorance effect dominates the stakeholdership effect in promoting criteria based on pure performance.

ix) *SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX POST*: stakeholders after the removal of the ignorance of payoff distribution opt significantly less for *Protection + logic* (33 percent vs. approximately 4 percent—Table 2), but significantly more for *Copying* (5 percent vs. approximately 20 percent—Table 2) and *Logic* (10 percent vs. approximately 24 percent) than do spectators after the removal of the ignorance of payoff distribution. Choice aggregation documents that stakeholders after the removal of the ignorance of payoff distribution choose significantly less *Protection* (the difference is almost 40 percent—Table 2) and *At least Logic*. This comparison documents the effect of stakeholdership on the removal of the ignorance of payoff distribution.

x) *SPECTATOR EX POST vs. INFOSTAKE*: spectators after the removal of the ignorance of payoff distribution opt significantly more for *Protection + logic* (33 percent vs. approximately 3 percent—Table 2) and *Protection + copying* (13 percent vs. approximately 2 percent) and significantly less for *Luck* (18 percent vs. approximately 42 percent—Table 2)

and *Copying* (5 percent vs. approximately 17 percent—Table 2) than do ex ante-informed stakeholders. Choice aggregation documents that informed stakeholders choose significantly less *Protection* and *At least logic*. These findings might be viewed as the combined effect of stakeholdership without ignorance of payoff distribution and removal of ignorance for spectators.

TABLE S5

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT TREATMENTS ON PLAYERS' CHOICES (ROBUSTNESS CHECK)

	STAKE ex ante - STAKE ex post	SPECTATOR ex ante - STAKE ex ante	SPECTATOR ex ante - STAKE ex post	SPECTATOR ex ante - INFOSTAKE	SPECTATOR ex post - STAKE ex ante	SPECTATOR ex post - STAKE ex post	SPECTATOR ex post - INFOSTAKE	STAKE ex ante - INFOSTAKE	STAKE ex post - INFOSTAKE	SPECTATOR ex ante - SPECTATOR ex post
Luck (1)	-0.216*** (0.057)	0.032** (0.033)	-0.160** (0.075)	-0.324*** (0.103)	0.050*** (0.046)	-0.125 (0.078)	-0.334*** (0.105)	-0.380*** (0.086)	-0.115 (0.099)	-0.003 (0.010)
Protection + copying (2)	0.082** (0.045)	-0.062 (0.053)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.047 (0.063)	0.021** (0.029)	0.037* (0.043)	0.133** (0.052)	0.000 (0.000)	-4.16e-07 (2.07e-06)
Protection +logic (3)	0.203*** (0.059)	0.175* (0.102)	0.427*** (0.090)	0.480*** (0.091)	-0.001 (0.090)	0.237*** (0.082)	0.233*** (0.079)	0.212*** (0.067)	-1.05e-22 (3.43e-18)	0.191*** (0.069)
Logic (4)	-0.046 (0.069)	-0.070 (0.065)	-0.111 (0.075)	-0.085 (0.094)	-0.119** (0.055)	-0.168** (0.068)	-0.121 (0.083)	-0.041 (0.086)	0.007 (0.088)	1.27e-15*** (1.08e-13)
Copying (5)	-0.138** (0.058)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.193*** (0.059)	-0.067 (0.065)	0.006 (0.040)	-0.149** (0.066)	-0.053 (0.050)	-0.061 (0.062)	0.070 (0.079)	-9.12e-06 (0.000)
Equal (6)	0.031 (0.057)	-0.063 (0.052)	-0.042 (0.037)	-2.23e-08* (3.80e-07)	0.036 (0.074)	0.057 (0.073)	0.033 (0.056)	0.029 (0.057)	0.006 (0.058)	0.000* (0.000)
Combination of choices										
Protection (2) + (3) + (6)	0.449*** (0.076)	-0.028 (0.104)	0.537*** (0.099)	0.534*** (0.105)	-0.038 (0.100)	0.508*** (0.097)	0.492*** (0.105)	0.526*** (0.089)	0.034 (0.081)	-0.025 (0.078)
At least Logic (3) + (4)	0.273*** (0.082)	0.089 (0.103)	0.383 (0.098)***	0.482*** (0.113)	-0.174 (0.104)	0.130 (0.098)	0.139 (0.112)	0.311*** (0.099)	-0.025 (0.973)	0.396*** (0.075)
At least copying (2) + (5)	-0.035 (0.078)	-0.105 (0.070)	-0.150 (0.072)*	-0.035 (0.078)	-0.043 (0.082)	-0.081 (0.080)	0.028 (0.085)	0.127 (0.082)	0.147 (0.084)	-0.015 (0.019)
Desert (2) + (3) + (4) + (5)	0.242*** (0.080)	-0.033 (0.082)	0.213** (0.091)	0.451*** (0.113)	-0.216** (0.093)	0.047 (0.098)	0.232* (0.121)	0.434*** (0.101)	0.117 (0.107)	0.209*** (0.072)

Coefficient and standard error (in round brackets) of the CONDITION variable in a regression in which the criterion in row is regressed on a set of socio-demographic controls (see equations (1) and (2) in section 5.2.2). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Econometric estimates on the entire sample

By model construction (see econometric models in the previous section), significant results express deviations from the choice of the presumably most disinterested player (the uninformed spectator). The results show that receiving information (EXPOST) significantly adds an 18 and an 8 percent to the sample share of participants who chose *Luck* and pure *Copying* criteria, respectively, and significantly subtracts 22 percent of those who chose *Protection + logic* (Table S6).[2] Moreover, and always with respect to the benchmark of the uninformed spectator, stakeholdership adds 9 percent to the pure *Copying* and 12 percent to the pure *Logic* choices, whereas it subtracts 27 percent from the *Protection + logic* choices. These findings imply that the combined effect of stakeholdership and of the "removal of ignorance of payoffs" subtracts almost 50 percent of experiment participants from the sample share of those who chose *Protection + logic*. Finally, the condition of ex ante-informed stakeholders, independently from the other two effects, subtracts 6.5 percent from the *Protection + copying* choice, supporting the hypothesis that preference for choosing the *Copying* criterion is higher after rather than before players perform the activity.

With respect to the combined criteria, the "removal of ignorance" of payoffs subtracts shares of around 25, 24 and 21 percent from criteria involving *Protection*, *At least logic* and *Desert,* respectively (Table S7). Finally, stakeholder status subtracts 25 percent of the *Protection* criterion, implying that the combined effect of the removal of ignorance and stakeholdership subtracts 50 percent of the sample share of participants who choose *Protection*. We check whether the above described findings are robust when we estimate the model without all the set of controls or with a richer set of controls[3] and find that they are (evidence is omitted for reasons of space and available upon request).

[2] The estimate having as dependent variable the *Protection+random* choice is omitted due to presence of too few choices of this criterion (6 out of 353).

[3] We included a variable measuring how many times in a year the respondent usually attends a religious service, the average score of university exams, the total number of respondent's household members, a variable for the size of the town in which subjects live, a variable measuring how many times in a week the respondent reads newspapers, a

In order to check more directly whether the effect of what we find depends on the fact that stakeholders change their choice toward what maximizes their own payoff when informed, we create additional specifications for each choice where we regress each choice on the information variable, the stakeholder variable and the interaction (information*stakeholder) variable. We find that most of the effects are concentrated in the interaction terms. These findings confirm that when stakeholders are informed about the payoff distribution they revise significantly their choice in direction of less desert and less protection (consistently with their self-interest). Results are provided in Tables S8 and S9 for individual and aggregate choices respectively.

Our econometric analysis may as well help to verify more in depth whether stakeholders search for the choice that maximizes their own payoff when they have information about it. To this purpose we build a variable measuring the difference between the performance in the choice measured by the dependent variable (i.e. in the random criterion if the dependent variable is the random criterion) and the average payoff under the different criteria. We find that the variable is strongly positive and significant for all estimated criteria with the exception of those requiring partial protection when we estimate the model for the full sample (Table S10). The result holds also when we limit the model to stakeholders with information (Table S11), consistently with our findings showing that informed stakeholders choose the criterion that maximizes their own payoff. The result remains significant if we use the fully augmented specification and if we use the specification without controls (omitted for reasons of space and available upon request).

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variable measuring the general willingness of the respondent in taking risk, dummy variables taking value one if the respondent: has no brothers or sisters; is Catholic, is engaged in social activities as volunteer; has an ERASMUS experience; declared that he has lived abroad for at least more than 1 month in the past; is also a worker, and dummy variables taking the value of one if: the respondent's parents are married; the respondent's mother has at least high school education; the respondent's father has at least high school education.

TABLE S6 THE EFFECT OF "IGNORANCE OF PAYOFFS" AND STAKEHOLDERSHIP ON PLAYERS' CHOICES

VARIABLES	*Luck*	*Copying*	*Logic*	*Protection + copying*	*Protection + logic*	*Equal*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Expost	0.177***	0.080**	-0.006	-0.049	-0.220***	0.023
	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.037)
Info	0.132*	-0.013	-0.012	-0.065**	-0.088	-0.028
	(0.074)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.030)	(0.067)	(0.048)
Stakeholder	0.040	0.089**	0.121**	-0.004	-0.271***	0.016
	(0.058)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.080)	(0.050)
Year of birth	-0.011	0.006	-0.009	0.004	0.007	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Male	0.068	0.030	0.101*	0.005	-0.160**	-0.066
	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.062)	(0.049)
Income	-0.042*	0.006	0.044*	-0.034**	-0.031	0.048***
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.018)
MathGrade	-0.002	-0.001	0.005**	0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wald $\chi 2$	33.45	12.95	13.09	12.56	63.70	9.71
(p- value)	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.00)	(0.21)
Observations	296	296	296	296	296	296

TABLE S7 THE EFFECT OF "IGNORANCE OF PAYOFFS" AND STAKEHOLDERSHIP ON COMBINED PLAYERS' CHOICES

VARIABLES	*Protection*	*At least copying*	*At least logic*	*Desert*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expost	-0.246***	0.038	-0.242***	-0.207***
	(0.055)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Info	-0.162*	-0.066	-0.060	-0.125
	(0.089)	(0.056)	(0.086)	(0.083)
Stakeholder	-0.251***	0.102**	-0.094	0.019

	(0.070)	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.073)
Year of birth	0.016	0.006	-0.003	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Male	-0.259***	0.007	-0.011	0.003
	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.067)
Income	-0.025	-0.013	0.014	0.000
	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.029)
MathGrade	-0.004	-0.001	0.004	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Wald $\chi2$	62.46	5.33	33.77	27.91
(p- value)	(0.00)	(0.62)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	322	322	322	322

Table S8 The effect of the interaction between stakeholdership and information on choice

VARIABLES	*Luck*	*Copying*	*Logic*	*Protection + copying*	*Protection + logic*	*Equal*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Expost	0.001	0.001	-0.066	0.016	-0.060	0.095**
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Stakeholder	-0.148	0.038	0.087	0.037	-0.124*	0.071
	(0.104)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.073)	(0.054)
Stakeholderinformed	0.340***	0.104	0.074	-0.118**	-0.257***	-0.114*
	(0.097)	(0.082)	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.061)
Year of birth	-0.010	0.006	-0.009	0.004	0.007	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Male	0.071	0.029	0.102*	0.005	-0.158**	-0.065
	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.062)	(0.049)
Income	-0.042*	0.007	0.045*	-0.035**	-0.030	0.048***
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.018)
MathGrade	-0.002	-0.001	0.005**	0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wald $\chi2$	30.96	15.72	16.86	13.24	50.12	12.28
(p- value)	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.066)	(0.000)	(0.092)
Observations	296	296	296	296	296	296

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S9 The effect of the interaction between stakeholdership and information on choice (aggregate criteria)

VARIABLES	*Protection*	*At least copying*	*At least logic*	*Desert*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expost	0.017	0.067	-0.182***	-0.131**
	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Stakeholder	-0.028	0.124**	-0.042	0.094
	(0.089)	(0.063)	(0.089)	(0.093)
Stakeholderinformed	-0.449***	-0.069	-0.119	-0.178**
	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.090)
Year	0.017	0.006	-0.003	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Male	-0.267***	0.006	-0.011	0.001
	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.067)
Income	-0.025	-0.012	0.014	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.029)
MathGrade	-0.004	-0.001	0.004	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Wald $\chi 2$	67.22	4.81	35.83	26.66
(p- value)	(0.000)	(0.683)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	322	322	322	322

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S10 The impact of payoffs on players' choices (only stakeholders)

VARIABLES	*Luck*	*Copying*	*Logic*	*Protection + copying*	*Protection + logic*	*Equal*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Expost	0.240***	0.074**	-0.007	-0.086**	-0.288***	-0.023
	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.043)	(0.069)	(0.049)
Info	0.122*	-0.011	-0.007	-0.042	0.009	-0.016
	(0.062)	(0.032)	(0.060)	(0.033)	(0.067)	(0.044)
Year	0.003	-0.006	-0.012	0.007	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Male	0.014	0.003	0.050	0.019	-0.127**	-0.035
	(0.053)	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.044)
Income	-0.025	0.008	0.044*	-0.024**	-0.048***	0.055***
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.019)
MathGrade	-0.002	-0.002**	0.002	-0.000	-0.003*	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Deltapay_Luck	0.028***					
	(0.004)					
Deltapay_Copying		0.035***				
		(0.008)				
Deltapay_Logic			0.057***			
			(0.010)			
Deltapay_Protection+copying				0.008		
				(0.007)		
Deltapay_Protection+logic					0.001	
					(0.006)	
Deltapay_Equal						0.046***

						(0.009)
Wald $\chi 2$	37.13	33.24	28.18	26.72	46.54	42.25
(p- value)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	212	212	212	212	212	212

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S11 The impact of payoffs on players' choices (only informed stakeholders)

VARIABLES	*Luck*	*Copying*	*Logic*	*Protection + copying*	*Protection + logic*	*Equal*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info	0.168**	0.004	0.001	-0.008	0.004	-0.013
	(0.072)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.026)
Year	-0.015	0.001	-0.010	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Male	-0.004	-0.025	-0.053	-0.003	-0.038	-0.014
	(0.060)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Income	-0.043	0.009	0.009	-0.006	-0.004	0.026
	(0.033)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.016)
MathGrade	-0.000	-0.002	0.001	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Deltapay_Luck	0.065***					
	(0.017)					
Deltapay_Copying		0.034**				
		(0.013)				
Deltapay_Logic			0.058***			
			(0.015)			
Deltapay_Protection+copying				0.006		
				(0.004)		
Deltapay_Protection+logic					0.008*	
					(0.004)	
Deltapay_Equal						0.040***
						(0.014)
Wald $\chi 2$	34.43	32.98	23.93	24.56	13.95	33.94
p- value)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.000)
Observations	133	133	133	133	133	133

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Section III

INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions for both the STAKE and the INFOSTAKE treatment

SCREEN 1. Welcome to the experiment, and thank you for participating. Please follow the instructions that will appear on your screen. There is nothing complicated, or tricky questions. Your answers will be absolutely anonymous. It will not be possible for the experimenters to match the answers with the person who provided them. For the success of the experiment, it is necessary that you do not communicate with each other.
At the end of the experiment you will receive your payment. It will depend on your choices, on the others' choices and on luck.

SCREEN 2. A sum of **210** Euro has to be allocated among the participants. The sum may be distributed through different criteria. In particular, it may be allocated on the basis of:
CRITERION 1 – a random draw
CRITERION 2 – the egalitarian rule
CRITERION 3 – participants' relative performance in a secretarial task
CRITERION 4 – participants' relative performance in solving a set of quiz
CRITERION 5 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of criterion 1
CRITERION 6 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of criterion 3
CRITERION 7 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of criterion 4
In the next screens you will find a detailed description of these criteria

SCREEN 3. CRITERION 1 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A RANDOM DRAW
For each participant, the computer randomly draws a number between 1 and 100. The allocation of the sum of money depends on the drawn numbers. That is, the **210** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number drawn for each participant and the sum of all the numbers drawn for all participants.
Example. 3 participants take part in the experiment. The sum to be allocated is **42** Euro. The numbers drawn for the 3 participants are 3, 7 and 25 respectively. The sum of the numbers is 3 + 7 + 25 = 35. The subject associated to the number 3 will receive: 3/35*42 = 3.60 Euro. The payments will be **3.60** Euro**, 8.40** Euro and **30.00** Euro respectively**.**
CRITERION 2 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF THE EGALITARIAN RULE
210 Euro are equally distributed among the **15** participants. That is, each participant receives **14** Euro

SCREEN 4. CRITERION 3 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN A SECRETARIAL TASK
Participants are asked to perform a secretarial task for **15** minutes. The secretarial task consists of copying information about fictitious students (enrolment number, name, surname and mark) into a file. Each participant receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of copied lines. That is, the **210** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of lines correctly copied by each participant and the sum of all the lines correctly copied by all participants.
Example. Three subjects participate in the experiment. The sum to be allocated is **42** Euro. The number of lines correctly copied by the 3 participants are 30, 30 and 42 respectively. The sum of the lines is 30 + 30 + 42 = 102. The subject who correctly copied 30 lines will receive: 30/102*42 = **12.35** Euro. The payments will be **12.35** Euro**, 12.35** Euro and **17.29** Euro respectively**.**

FIGURE 2 HERE

SCREEN 5. CRITERION 4 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN SOLVING A SET OF QUIZ

Participants are asked to perform some tasks concerning quiz solution for **15** minutes. Each participant receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of correct answers. That is, the **210** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of correct answers provided by each participant and the sum of all the correct answers provided by all participants.
Example. Three subjects participate in the experiment. The sum to be allocated is **42** Euro. The number of correct answers provided by the 3 participants are 8, 10 and 12 respectively. The sum of the correct answers is 8 + 10 + 12 = 30. The subject who provided 8 correct answers will receive: 8/30*42 = **11.20** Euro. The payments will be **11.20** Euro**, 14.00** Euro and **16.80** Euro respectively**.**

FIGURE 3 HERE

SCREEN 6. CRITERION 5 - ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A MIXED CRITERION: FIXED PAYOFF + RANDOM DRAW
30% of the sum – that is, **63** out of **210** Euro – is equally distributed among participants, while the remaining part – **147** Euro – is allocated through random draw.
This implies that each participant receives a payoff that consists of 2 parts:
a) a fixed playoff of **4.20** Euro
b) a variable part computed on the basis of criterion 1. That is, for each participant, the computer randomly draws a number between 1 and 100. The allocation of the sum of money depends on the drawn numbers. That is, the **147** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number drawn for each participant and the sum of all the numbers drawn for all participants.

SCREEN 7. CRITERION 6 - ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A MIXED CRITERION: FIXED PAYOFF + PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN A SECRETARIAL TASK
30% of the sum – that is, **63** out of **210** Euro – is equally distributed among participants, while the remaining part – **147** Euro – is allocated through participants' relative performance in a secretarial task.
This implies that each participant receives a payoff that consists of 2 parts:
a) a fixed playoff of **4.20** Euro
b) a variable part computed on the basis of criterion 3. That is, participants are asked to perform a secretarial task for **15** minutes. The secretarial task consists of copying information about fictitious students (enrolment number, name, surname and mark) into a file. Each participant receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of copied lines. That is, the **147** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of lines correctly copied by each participant and the sum of all the lines correctly copied by all participants.

SCREEN 8. CRITERION 7 - ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A MIXED CRITERION: FIXED PAYOFF + PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN SOLVING A SET OF QUIZ
30% of the sum – that is, **63** out of **210** Euro – is equally distributed among participants, while the remaining part – **147** Euro – is allocated through participants' relative performance in a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution.
This implies that each participant receives a payoff that consists of 2 parts:
a) a fixed playoff of **4.20** Euro
b) a variable part computed on the basis of criterion 3. That is, participants are asked to perform some tasks concerning quiz solution for **15** minutes. Each participant receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of correct answers. That is, the **147** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of correct answers provided by each participant and the sum of all the correct answers provided by all participants.

SCREEN 9.
*IN THE STAKE TREATMENT***:** In the first phase of the experiment each participants is asked to select the criterion to allocate the **210** Euro. During the second phase, participants will perform a secretarial task for **15** minutes and a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution for further **15** minutes. At the end of the experiment, the computer will draw a participant and his/her selected criterion will be implemented in order to allocate the **210** Euro.

IN THE INFOSTAKE TREATMENT: In the first phase of the experiment, participants will perform a secretarial task for **15** minutes and a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution for further **15** minutes. During the second phase, each participants is asked to select the criterion to allocate the **210** Euro. At the end of the experiment, the computer will draw a participant and his/her selected criterion will be implemented in order to allocate the **210** Euro.

SCREEN 10. Now, we ask you to answer some control questions. They will help you to verify whether the experimental rules are clear to you.
IN THE STAKE TREATMENT: When all participants provide the correct answers, the first phase of the experiment will start and each participant will select the criterion to allocate the **210** Euro
IN THE INFOSTAKE TREATMENT: When all participants provide the correct answers, the first phase of the experiment will start and each participant will perform the secretarial task for **15** minutes and a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution for further **15** minutes.

SCREEN 11. Control questions.

SCREEN 12 (*FOR THE STAKE TREATMENT ONLY*). Remember that the criteria are the following:
CRITERION 1 – a random draw
CRITERION 2 – the egalitarian rule
CRITERION 3 – participants' relative performance in a secretarial task
CRITERION 4 – participants' relative performance in solving a set of quiz
CRITERION 5 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of a random draw
CRITERION 6 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of participants' relative performance in a secretarial task
CRITERION 7 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of participants' relative performance in a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution

Now, we ask you to select the criterion to allocate the 210 Euro:

CRITERION 1
CRITERION 2
CRITERION 3
CRITERION 4
CRITERION 5
CRITERION 6
CRITERION 7

FOR BOTH TREATMENTS:AT THIS POINT THE SECRETARIAL TASK AND THE POOL OF TASKS CONCERNING THE QUIZ SOLUTION

SCREEN 12BIS. *FOR STAKE TREATMENT ONLY*. Now, we ask you to declare how many participants you think will have a payoff higher than yours under each possible criterion. You will receive an extra payment on the basis of the goodness of your guess concerning the criterion that will be chosen by the participant drawn by the computer. If the criterion chosen by the participant drawn by the computer is criterion 2, your extra payment will be computed on the goodness of your guess concerning another criterion that will be randomly drawn by the computer.
Now, we ask you to declare how many participants you think will have a payoff higher than yours under:

CRITERION 1 _____

CRITERION 3_____
CRITERION 4_____
CRITERION 5_____
CRITERION 6_____
CRITERION 7_____

SCREEN 13. *Results related to all criteria are displayed:*
For the SECRETARIAL TASK we report both the total number of lines correctly copied by all the participants and the number of lines correctly copied by each participant.
For the POOL OF TASKS CONCERNING THE QUIZ SOLUTION we report both the total number of correct answers provided by all the participants and the number of correct answers provided by each participant.
For the RANDOM DRAW we report both the sum of the numbers drawn by the computer for all the participants and the number drawn by the computer for each participant.

SCREEN 14. *Potential payoffs (computed on the basis of the results displayed in screen 13) are displayed:*
In this screen we: 1) report the payoff each participant would obtain for each possible criterion; 2) remind each player the criterion chosen before; [3) we inform participants that in the following screen they will have the possibility to choose the preferred criterion again IN THE STAKE TREATMENT ONLY].

SCREEN 15. Remember that the criteria are the following:
CRITERION 1 – a random draw
CRITERION 2 – the egalitarian rule
CRITERION 3 – participants' relative performance in a secretarial task
CRITERION 4 – participants' relative performance in solving a set of quiz
CRITERION 5 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of a random draw
CRITERION 6 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of participants' relative performance in a secretarial task
CRITERION 7 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of participants' relative performance in a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution

[In the first phase of the experiment you chose criterion X. Now, you have the possibility to choose again. In this case, you can either confirm your past choice or choose another criterion. At the end of the experiment, the computer will draw a participant and the criterion s/he will select NOW will be implemented in order to allocate the **210** Euro. *IN THE STAKE TREATMENT ONLY*]
We remind you that: 1) the computer drew the number Y for you; 2) you correctly copied Z lines in the secretarial task; 3) you provided W correct answers in the pool of tasks concerning quiz solution.
Now, we ask you to select the criterion to allocate the 210 Euro:

CRITERION 1
CRITERION 2
CRITERION 3
CRITERION 4
CRITERION 5
CRITERION 6
CRITERION 7

SCREEN 16. *Final payoffs display*.

AT THIS POINT, PARTICIPANTS ARE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE TO A HOLT&LAURY LOTTERY AND TO FILL IN A BRIEF QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE RECEIVING THEIR PAYMENT

Instructions for the SPECTATOR treatment

Two kinds of participants participate in this treatment – Player A and Player B. At the beginning of the experiment, Player Bs only are in the lab. They read instructions from screen 1 to screen 11. Then, they perform both the secretarial task and the pool of tasks concerning quiz solution. At this point, Player As enter the lab and they read instructions from screen 1 to screen 11. In the meanwhile, Player Bs fill in a questionnaire. From screen 12 both kinds of players read instructions together.

SCREEN 1. Welcome to the experiment, and thank you for participating. Please follow the instructions that will appear on your screen. There is nothing complicated, or tricky questions. Your answers will be absolutely anonymous. It will not be possible for the experimenters to match the answers with the person who provided them. For the success of the experiment, it is necessary that you do not communicate with each other.
At the end of the experiment you will receive your payment. It will depend on your choices, on the others' choices and on luck.

SCREEN 2. The experiment involves two different kinds of participants – participant A and participant B. participant As are asked to decide how to allocate a sum of **210** Euro among participant Bs.

The sum may be distributed through different criteria. In particular, it may be allocated on the basis of:
CRITERION 1 – a random draw
CRITERION 2 – the egalitarian rule
CRITERION 3 – participants' relative performance in a secretarial task
CRITERION 4 – participants' relative performance in solving a set of quiz
CRITERION 5 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of criterion 1
CRITERION 6 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of criterion 3
CRITERION 7 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participants, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of criterion 4
In the next screens you will find a detailed description of these criteria

FOR PARTICIPANT Bs ONLY: In the lab, only participant Bs are participating in the experiment at the moment. Participant As will enter the experiment in a successive phase.
FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY: Participants who enter the lab are all participant As. Participant Bs are still in the lab. They have just performed both the secretarial task and the pool of tasks concerning quiz solution.

SCREEN 3. CRITERION 1 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A RANDOM DRAW
For each participant B, the computer randomly draws (*FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY*: has drawn) a number between 1 and 100. The allocation of the sum of money depends on the drawn numbers. That is, the **210** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number drawn for each participant B and the sum of all the numbers drawn for all participants B.
Example. 3 subject Bs participate in the experiment. The sum to be allocated is **42** Euro. The numbers drawn for the 3 participant Bs are 3, 7 and 25 respectively. The sum of the numbers is 3 + 7 + 25 = 35. The subject B associated to the number 3 will receive: 3/35*42 = 3.60 Euro. The payments will be **3.60** Euro**, 8.40** Euro and **30.00** Euro respectively**.**

CRITERION 2 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF THE EGALITARIAN RULE
210 Euro are equally distributed among the **15** participant Bs. That is, each participant B receives **14** Euro

SCREEN 4. CRITERION 3 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN A SECRETARIAL TASK

Participant B are asked to perform (*FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY*: have performed) a secretarial task for **15** minutes. The secretarial task consists of copying information about fictitious students (enrolment number, name, surname and mark) into a file. Each participant B receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of copied lines. That is, the **210** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of lines correctly copied by each participant B and the sum of all the lines correctly copied by all participant Bs.
Example. Three subject Bs participate in the experiment. The sum to be allocated is **42** Euro. The number of lines correctly copied by the 3 participant Bs are 30, 30 and 42 respectively. The sum of the lines is 30 + 30 + 42 = 102. The subject B who correctly copied 30 lines will receive: 30/102*42 = **12.35** Euro. The payments will be **12.35** Euro**, 12.35** Euro and **17.29** Euro respectively**.**

FIGURE 2 HERE

SCREEN 5. CRITERION 4 – ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN A POOL OF TASKS CONCERNING QUIZ SOLUTION
Participant Bs are asked to perform (*FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY*: have performed) some tasks concerning quiz solution for **15** minutes. Each participant B receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of correct answers. That is, the **210** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of correct answers provided by each participant B and the sum of all the correct answers provided by all participant Bs.
Example. Three subject Bs participate in the experiment. The sum to be allocated is **42** Euro. The number of correct answers provided by the 3 participant Bs are 8, 10 and 12 respectively. The sum of the correct answers is 8 + 10 + 12 = 30. The subject B who provided 8 correct answers will receive: 8/30*42 = **11.20** Euro. The payments will be **11.20** Euro**, 14.00** Euro and **16.80** Euro respectively**.**

FIGURE 3 HERE

SCREEN 6. CRITERION 5 - ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A MIXED CRITERION: FIXED PAYOFF + RANDOM DRAW
30% of the sum – that is, **63** out of **210** Euro – is equally distributed among participant Bs, while the remaining part – **147** Euro – is allocated through random draw.
This implies that each participant B receives a payoff that consists of 2 parts:
a) a fixed playoff of **4.20** Euro
b) a variable part computed on the basis of criterion 1. That is, for each participant B, the computer randomly draws a number between 1 and 100. The allocation of the sum of money depends on the drawn numbers. That is, the **147** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number drawn for each participant B and the sum of all the numbers drawn for all participant Bs.

SCREEN 7. CRITERION 6 - ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A MIXED CRITERION: FIXED PAYOFF + PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN A SECRETARIAL TASK
30% of the sum – that is, **63** out of **210** Euro – is equally distributed among participant Bs, while the remaining part – **147** Euro – is allocated through participants Bs' relative performance in a secretarial task.
This implies that each participant B receives a payoff that consists of 2 parts:
a) a fixed playoff of **4.20** Euro
b) a variable part computed on the basis of criterion 3. That is, participant Bs are asked to perform a secretarial task for **15** minutes. The secretarial task consists of copying information about fictitious students (enrolment number, name, surname and mark) into a file. Each participant B receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of copied lines. That is, the **147** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of lines correctly copied by each participant B and the sum of all the lines correctly copied by all participant Bs.

SCREEN 8. CRITERION 7 - ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF A MIXED CRITERION: FIXED PAYOFF + PARTICIPANTS' RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN A POOL OF TASKS CONCERNING QUIZ SOLUTION

30% of the sum – that is, **63** out of **210** Euro – is equally distributed among participant Bs, while the remaining part – **147** Euro – is allocated through participants Bs' relative performance in a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution.

This implies that each participant B receives a payoff that consists of 2 parts:

a) a fixed playoff of **4.20** Euro

b) a variable part computed on the basis of criterion 3. That is, participant Bs are asked to perform some tasks concerning quiz solution for **15** minutes. Each participant B receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of correct answers. That is, the **147** Euro are distributed on the basis of the ratio between the number of correct answers provided by each participant B and the sum of all the correct answers provided by all participant Bs.

SCREEN 9.

*FOR PARTICIPANT Bs ONLY***:** In the first phase of the experiment, participant Bs will perform a secretarial task for **15** minutes and a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution for further **15** minutes. During the second phase, participant As will enter the lab and each of them will be asked to select the criterion to allocate the **210** Euro among participant Bs. At the end of the experiment, the computer will draw a participant A and his/her selected criterion will be implemented in order to allocate the **210** Euro among participant Bs.

*FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY***:** In the first phase of the experiment, participant Bs have performed a secretarial task for **15** minutes and a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution for further **15** minutes. Now, each participant A is asked to select the criterion to allocate the **210** Euro among participant Bs. At the end of the experiment, the computer will draw a participant A and his/her selected criterion will be implemented in order to allocate the **210** Euro among participant Bs.

Each participant A receives a fixed amount of 7€.

SCREEN 10. Now, we ask you to answer some control questions. They will help you to verify whether the experimental rules are clear to you.

FOR PARTICIPANT Bs ONLY: When all participants provide the correct answers, the first phase of the experiment will start and each participant B will perform the secretarial task for **15** minutes and a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution for further **15** minutes.

FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY: When all participants provide the correct answers, the next phase of the experiment will start and each participant A will select the criterion to allocate the **210** Euro among participant Bs.

SCREEN 11. Control questions.

SCREEN 11BIS. *FOR PARTICIPANT Bs ONLY***.** Now, we ask you to declare how many participant Bs you think will have a payoff higher than yours under each possible criterion. You will receive an extra payment on the basis of the goodness of your guess concerning the criterion that will be chosen by the participant A drawn by the computer. If the criterion chosen by the participant A drawn by the computer is criterion 2, your extra payment will be computed on the goodness of your guess concerning another criterion that will be randomly drawn by the computer.

Now, we ask you to declare how many participant Bs you think will have a payoff higher than yours under:

CRITERION 1 _____
CRITERION 3_____
CRITERION 4_____
CRITERION 5_____
CRITERION 6_____
CRITERION 7_____

AT THIS POINT THE SECRETARIAL TASK AND THE POOL OF TASKS CONCERNING QUIZ SOLUTION ARE PERFORMED

SCREEN 12

FOR PARTICIPANT Bs ONLY. Participant As are choosing a criterion to allocate the 210 Euro among participant Bs. Please wait.

*FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY***.** Remember that the criteria are the following:

CRITERION 1 – a random draw

CRITERION 2 – the egalitarian rule

CRITERION 3 – participant Bs' relative performance in a secretarial task

CRITERION 4 – participant Bs' relative performance in activities concerning the quiz solution

CRITERION 5 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participant Bs, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of a random draw

CRITERION 6 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participant Bs, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of their relative performance in a secretarial task

CRITERION 7 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participant Bs, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of their relative performance in a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution

Now, we ask you to select the criterion to allocate the 210 Euro among participant Bs:

CRITERION 1
CRITERION 2
CRITERION 3
CRITERION 4
CRITERION 5
CRITERION 6
CRITERION 7

SCREEN 13. *Results related to all criteria are displayed:*

For the SECRETARIAL TASK we report both the total number of lines correctly copied by all the participant Bs and the number of lines correctly copied by each participant B.

For the POOL OF TASKS CONCERNING QUIZ SOLUTION we report both the total number of correct answers provided by all the participant Bs and the number of correct answers provided by each participant B.

For the RANDOM DRAW we report both the sum of the numbers drawn by the computer for all the participant Bs and the number drawn by the computer for each participant B.

SCREEN 14. *Potential payoffs (computed on the basis of the results displayed in screen 13) are displayed:*

In this screen we: 1) report the payoff each participant B would obtain for each possible criterion; [2) remind each player A the criterion chosen before; 3) we inform participant As that in the following screen they will have the possibility to choose the preferred criterion again. FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY]

SCREEN 15. *FOR PARTICIPANT As ONLY.* Remember that the criteria are the following:

CRITERION 1 – a random draw

CRITERION 2 – the egalitarian rule

CRITERION 3 – participant Bs' relative performance in a secretarial task

CRITERION 4 – participant Bs' relative performance in several activities concerning quiz solution

CRITERION 5 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participant Bs, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of a random draw

CRITERION 6 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participant Bs, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of their relative performance in a secretarial task

CRITERION 7 – a mixed criterion: 30% of the sum – that is, **63 out of 210** Euro – is uniformly distributed among the participant Bs, while the remaining **147** Euro are allocated on the basis of their relative performance in a pool of tasks concerning quiz solution

In the first phase of the experiment, you chose criterion X. Now, you have the possibility to choose again. In this case, you can either confirm your past choice or choose another criterion. At the end of the experiment, the computer will draw a participant A and the criterion s/he will select NOW will be implemented in order to allocate the **210** Euro among participant Bs.
Now, we ask you to select the criterion to allocate the **210** Euro among participant Bs:

CRITERION 1
CRITERION 2
CRITERION 3
CRITERION 4
CRITERION 5
CRITERION 6
CRITERION 7

SCREEN 16. *Final payoffs display.*

AT THIS POINT, PARTICIPANTS ARE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE TO A HOLT&LAURY LOTTERY. THEN, PARTICIPANT BS RECEIVE THEIR PAYMENT WHILE PARTICIPANT AS FILL IN A BRIEF QUESTIONNAIRE. FINALLY, PARTICIPANT AS RECEIVE THEIR PAYMENT

FIGURE 2

Number	*Enrolment Number*	*Surname*	*Name*	*Mark*
1	503927	Jhnwkmz	Bdgjsv	4
2	498610	Wpjzxf	Ziawymqg	4
3	618739	Acdefkw	Beklntw	1
4	938176	Aehjps	Ncbfduzv	1
5	579264	Bijnpvx	Ikmqrtw	3
6	012378	Dnuvwx	Lzehckp	1
7	023567	Bceifhkj	Cdefhnop	1
8	039715	Vzuywlqt	Zcwbrmv	5
9	218697	Bceijm	Bcegkrwx	8
10	236590	Zoidgjn	Djpqruvx	9
11	483529	Cdjlmp	Ngkoeqdz	0
12	691372	Abchistw	Dfjqtx	1
13	023678	Aijrsuw	Cdefilx	9
14	012358	Cdhjpw	Emotvx	0
15	251749	Adlsux	Ulyzpqcn	1
16	012458	Oaxzpc	Aelmpcz	0
17	349720	Afhipxy	Zsnvxmo	7
18	056918	Hipqrx	Dfglrtvx	0
19	123567	Bdjluy	Mqazerc	1
20	259107	Aeghkqtx	Bfhqtvw	0
21	012346	Wrksqvzl	Ajksuw	3
22	923407	Gtxeblzo	Idztqa	4
23	609248	Acgnorwy	Fjmprvxy	7
24	513089	Yznjsfk	Zbjsoe	9
25	157209	Adhilx	Ceglnry	8
26	134567	Zqexav	Filmvy	5
27	015678	Cnpsvx	Dhkrwy	7

FIGURE 3











Analogie

Bicicletta-Automobile



Section IV

Questionnaire

1. Date of Birth

Year |__||__||__||__|

2. Sex

Male ☐ Female ☐

3. Height _____

4. Place of Birth (Town and Province) _____

5. How many brothers and sisters do you have?

brothers |__||__|
sisters |__||__|

6. Please indicate the date of birth of your sisters and brothers:

Date of birth of your sisters:
_____

Date of birth of your brothers:
_____

7. How many members does your family have? (indicate the number of people who live with you, including yourself)

|__||__|

8. Please indicate the specific composition of your family, that is, people who live with you:

Father	Yes ☐	No ☐
Mother	Yes ☐	No ☐
Number of grandfathers:	|__||__|	
Number of grandmothers_	|__||__|	
Number of brothers:	|__||__|	
Number of sisters:	|__||__|	
Girlfriend/Boyfriend	Yes ☐	No ☐
Wife/husband	Yes ☐	No ☐

Other people (specify):
_____

9. How many inhabitants does your town have?

Less than 10.000 ☐
Between 10.001 and 25.000 ☐
Between 25.001 and 50.000 ☐
Between 50.001 and 100.000 ☐
Between 100.001 and 300.000 ☐
More than 300.000 ☐

10. ZIP code of your address:
|__||__||__||__||__|

11. Taken all together, would you say that you are:

completely unhappy ↓ … completely happy ↓

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

12. Taken all together, how satisfied are you with your:

	completely dissatisfied ↓									completely satisfied ↓
Economic condition	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Health	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Relations with members of your family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Relations with friends	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Leisure time	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Life as-a-whole	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

13. Generally speaking, would you say …

☐ that most people can be trusted ☐ you can't be too careful in dealing with people.

14 Would you say that most of the time people …

☐ try to be helpful. ☐ are mostly just looking out for themselves.

15. Do you think most people would try to …

☐ take advantage of you if they got a chance. ☐ be fair.

16. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements using a 10 level scale:

	completely disagree ↓								completely agree ↓
Nowadays you can not trust strangers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

17. Consider the following institutions. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, indicate your level of trust using a 10 level scale:

	Nil ↓									Total ↓
Banks and financial institutions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Organized religion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Trade unions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Press	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
TV	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Public health	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Judicial system	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Police	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

18. Do you read newspaper at least once a week?

NO ☐
YES , 1 or 2 days a week ☐
YES, 3 or 4 days a week ☐
YES, 5 or 6 days a week ☐
Everyday ☐

19. How often do you follow the episodes concerning Italian politics?

Every day ☐
A few times a week ☐
Once a week ☐
A few times a month (less than 4) ☐
A few times a year ☐
Never ☐

20. How often have you voted in past referendum (please indicate the percentage): |__||__|

21. How often have you voted in past political election (please indicate the percentage): |__||__|

22. Thinking of your acquaintances and friends - not your family members - :

a) How many close friends (people you do not have problems to talk about your personal life with) would you say you have? n.___

b) How many acquaintances (people you would ask suggestions on different non personal situations) would you say you have? n.___

c) How many acquaintances and friends would lend you money if you were in economic trouble? n.___

23. Thinking of your relations with friends:

a) How often do you meet your friends in your leisure time?

Every day ☐
A few times a week ☐
Once a week ☐
A few times a month (less than 4) ☐
A few times a year ☐
I do not have friends ☐

24. Considering now just your relatives (your parents included)

a) How many relatives would lend you money if you were in economic trouble? n.___

b) How many relatives would you talk about your personal life to?
n.___

25. Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: 'unwilling to take risks' and the value 10 means: 'fully prepared to take risk'."



26. Imagine you had won 100,000 Euros in a lottery. Almost immediately after you collect, you receive the following financial offer from a reputable bank, the conditions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money within two years. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested
Would you invest:
0 € ☐
20.000 € ☐
40.000 € ☐
60.000 € ☐
80.000 € ☐
100.000 € ☐

27. You are:

Catholic	☐
Protestant	☐
Muslim	☐
Buddhist	☐
Jewish	☐
Atheist	☐
Agnostic	☐
Some other religion (specify) _____	☐

28. How often do you attend religious services?

Everyday	☐
A few times a week	☐
Once a week	☐
A few times a month (less than 4)	☐
A few times a year	☐
Never	☐

29. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements using a 10 level scale:

In dealing with people:

	completely disagree									completely agree
	↓									↓
It is a good norm to treat the others in the same way we would like to be treated	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
What really matters is to avoid being damaged by others' behaviours	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
It is important to obtain the maximum advantage	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

30. Over the last year have you donated to charities (Please indicate the number of donations for each possibility)

	n.
Nonprofit or voluntary associations	|__|__|
Religious Organizations	|__|__|
Natural person	|__|__|
Other	|__|__|

31. Generally speaking, do you think that the following behaviour may be justified?

	Never ↓								Always ↓
To receive social benefits (e.g invalidity pension) without having the right	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
To avoid a fare on public transport	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
To evade taxes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
To keep money you obtain by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owne	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
To fail to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
To skip the queue (e.g at the post office, in shops etc...)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

32. Do you do voluntary work?

Yes ☐
No ☐

33. How many voluntary organizations are you working in as a volunteer? n. |__|

34. Prevalent field of activity of the organization:

Culture, sport and recreation ☐
Education and research ☐
Health ☐
Social welfare ☐
Environment ☐
Economic development and social cohesion ☐
Rights protection and political activity ☐
Philanthropy ☐
Cooperation and international solidarity ☐
Religion ☐
Trade union relations ☐
Other (specify)_____

35. Now consider all the organization where you participated as a volunteer last year. How many hours did you spend per week, on average, doing voluntary work last year?
|__||__|

36. Now consider all the organizations where you participated as a volunteer during your life. How many years did you spend doing voluntary work in your life?
|__||__|

37. Civil status of your parents

Married	☐	=	1
Cohabitant	☐	=	2
Divorcée	☐	=	3
Separated	☐	=	4
Remarried after divorce	☐	=	5
Widow mother	☐	=	6
Widower father	☐	=	7

38. Mother's educational qualifications:

No title	☐
Primary School	☐
Junior high School (from age 11 to 14)	☐
Secondary-School certificate (3 Years)	☐
Secondary-School certificate (5 Years)	☐
Bachelor's degree	☐
Master's degree	☐
Phd	☐

39. . Father's educational qualifications:

No title	☐
Primary School	☐
Junior high School (from age 11 to 14)	☐
Secondary-School certificate (3 Years)	☐
Secondary-School certificate (5 Years)	☐
Bachelor's degree	☐
Master's degree	☐
Phd	☐

40. Please consider the following income classes. Could you indicate the class of your family considering wages, pensions and all the other income concerning your family's members? Choose the class considering the net income (after taxation).

Less than 15.000 euros	15.000,01- 28.000 euros	28.000,01 - 55.000 euros	55.000,01- 75.000 euros	More than 75.000 euros
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

41. Is your father unemployed?

Yes ☐ No ☐

42. Father's occupation (before retiring, if it is the case)

Official ☐
Executive ☐
Clerk ☐
Teacher ☐
Self-employed ☐
Worker ☐
Consultant ☐
Other (apecify)_____ ☐

43. Is your mother unemployed?

Yes ☐ No ☐

44. Mother's occupation (before retiring, if it is the case)

Official ☐
Executive ☐
Clerk ☐
Teacher ☐
Self-employed ☐
Worker ☐
Consultant ☐
Housewife ☐
Other (apecify)_____ ☐

45. How would you judge the career of your father (using a 10 level scale):

Very bad ↓ Very good ↓

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

46. How would you judge the career of your mother (using a 10 level scale):

Very bad ↓ Very good ↓

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

47. Place of birth of your father (Town and Province) _____

48. Place of birth of your mother (Town and Province) _____

49. Has the employment situation of your father improved in the last few years?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes:
because of a promotion ☐
because of a wage increase ☐
both ☐

If yes, is improved:
only the employment situation of your father ☐
the situation of all his colleagues ☐

50. Has the employment situation of your mother improved in the last few years?
Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes:
because of a promotion ☐
because of a wage increase ☐
both ☐

If yes, is improved:
only the employment situation of your mother ☐
the situation of all her colleagues ☐

51. Please indicate the type of your secondary school certificate:

School-leaving examination in a "liceo scientifico" ☐
School-leaving examination in a "liceo classico" ☐
School-leaving examination in "ragioneria" ☐
School-leaving examination in "ITIS" ☐
School-leaving examination in "IPSIA" ☐
School-leaving examination in "Agrario" ☐
Other (specify)_____

52. Score of the school leaving examination
|__||__||__|

53.
a) degree course you are enrolled in _____
b) year of course |__|
c) university exams already passed |__||__|
d) average mark |__||__|
e) number of exams concerning economics |__||__|

54. Did you take part in the Erasmus Program?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If Yes:

Please indicate the Nation where you spent your Erasmus Program and the number of months you spent in that Nation:

Nation _____
Months _____

55. Did you take part in other programs that implied a stay abroad?
(eg. Extra Plus, summer schools etc.)?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If Yes:

Please indicate the name of the program you took part in,
the Nations where you spent your time during the program(s)
and the number of months you spent in each Nation:

Name of program:_____Nation _____ Months _____
Name of program:_____Nation _____ Months _____
Name of program:_____Nation _____ Months _____
Name of program:_____Nation _____ Months _____

56. During your life, did you stay abroad for single periods longer than one month?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If Yes:

Please indicate the name of the Nations where you lived for more than one month:

Nation _____ Months _____
Nation _____ Months _____
Nation _____ Months _____
Nation _____ Months _____

57. Would you like to work abroad?

Yes, and I will try to find a job abroad ☐
Yes, but only if the job conditions were better than in Italy ☐
Yes, but only if I could not find a job in Italy ☐
No ☐

58. Do you live in Milan: Yes ☐ No ☐

59. Are you a student worker? Yes ☐ No ☐

60. How much do you think that the following things affect your happiness:

	Nil ↓									Total ↓
Health	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Career	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Friends	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

61. According to a recent UNDP report, a billion people own 80% of global wealth, while a billion and 200 million people have to live on less than a euro a day.

If you could:
You will not implement any redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor ☐
You will implement a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor so as to reduce the inequality by 25% ☐
You will implement a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor so as to reduce the inequality by 50% ☐
You will implement a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor so as to reduce the inequality by 75% ☐
You will implement a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor so as to reduce the inequality by 100% ☐

62. Which of the following income tax rate systems would you like to have in your country?

a) To be taxed at the rate of **10%** if your annual personal income is lower than **20.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **10%** if your annual personal income is between **20.000€** and **50.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **10%** if your annual personal income is higher than **50.000€**

b) To be taxed at the rate of **10%** if your annual personal income is lower than **20.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **20%** if your annual personal income is between **20.000€** and **50.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **30%** if your annual personal income is higher than **50.000€**

c) To be taxed at the rate of **10%** if your annual personal income is lower than **20.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **30%** if your annual personal income is between **20.000€** and **50.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **40%** if your annual personal income is higher than **50.000€**

d) To be taxed at the rate of **10%** if your annual personal income is lower than **20.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **40%** if your annual personal income is between **20.000€** and **50.000€**;
To be taxed at the rate of **60%** if your annual personal income is higher than **50.000€**

63. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statement using a 10 level scale:
"A limit to the wealth that may be accumulated by the rich should exist until poverty will be eliminated"



64. Please, indicate the option you prefer:

1. ☐ A) 708 euros immediately ☐ B) 709,80 next month
2. ☐ A) 708 euros immediately ☐ B) 712,50 next month
3. ☐ A) 708 euros immediately ☐ B) 717,00 next month
4. ☐ A) 708 euros immediately ☐ B) 726,00 next month

65. Please indicate your political preference:



66. Please can you indicate the party you voted in the last political election:

Name of the party:_____
I was not of age ☐
Absteined ☐ = 1
Blank ballot ☐ = 2

67. If you should vote now, which party would you vote:

Name of the party:_____
I would not vote ☐
Blank ballot ☐

68. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements using a 10 level scale:

completely disagree ↓ completely agree ↓

the more people contribute, the more they should receive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

people who need more should receive more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

justice, equity and equality are the most important requisites of a society 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

it is not correct from the moral point of view that children of the rich inherit a lot of money and children of the poor nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

employees who have the best performance should be more likely to be included in the top management of their organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

the salary should reflect the worker's effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

when students work in a team on a project, each member of the team should obtain the same mark, independently from the individual effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

decisions on promotions should be based on the effort made by the different employees in respect to their job 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

sometimes is ok giving a wage increase to the employee who is in need even though he is not the one who worked more hard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

it is always a bad idea to hire a person by simply considering if he needs the job or not
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

when a bonus is given to a team, it should always been equally shared among the members
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

The survey is finished

Thank you for your collaboration!